International Governance of mCDR: Small Steps Forward, but Much More Work to do – Climate Law Blog

Late last year, members of the international community convened in London to discuss issues relating to implementation of the 1972 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter (“London Convention”) and the 1996 Protocol to that Convention (“London Protocol”). Among the topics up for discussion was the application of the London Convention and Protocol to certain ocean-based climate change mitigation activities. Particular attention was given to so-called “marine geoengineering activities,” which the parties to the London Convention and Protocol have defined as any “deliberate intervention in the marine environment to manipulate natural processes, including to counteract anthropogenic climate change and/or its impacts, and that has the potential to result in deleterious effects.” Within this broad category, the parties have included a range of marine carbon dioxide removal (mCDR) activities, which seek to use the ocean to uptake and store carbon dioxide from the atmosphere.

The parties have been debating whether and how to regulate mCDR activities under the London Convention and Protocol for nearly two decades. While some progress has been made, it has often felt like “two steps forward, one step back.” This year’s meeting was no exception. The parties lamented the lack of progress and recognized the need for further work on mCDR, but expressed differing opinions on precisely what should be done. Unsurprisingly then, no concrete action was taken, with the parties only able to agree to issue a statement in which they pledged to undertake “further legal and technical analysis” and continue to “evaluate options for appropriate action.” That’s not much but there is reason to think that more progress might be made in the near future. A recently published summary of the parties’ discussions suggests that there has been some (albeit limited) forward movement and offers hope that development of a robust and effective governance framework for mCDR might be within reach.

The parties to the London Convention and Protocol first began looking at mCDR back in 2007. Their initial focus was on ocean fertilization, an mCDR approach that involves adding iron or other nutrients to the ocean to stimulate the growth of phytoplankton, which uptake carbon dioxide as they grow and convert it into organic carbon. It is assumed, but has not yet been scientifically proven, that some portion of the carbon ends up stored in the deep ocean and remains sequestered there for hundreds to thousands of years.

Despite the uncertainty regarding its effectiveness in durably storing carbon dioxide, in 2007, a U.S.-based company – Planktos – proposed to undertake a commercial ocean fertilization project to generate carbon credits for sale. That ultimately didn’t happen but the proposal prompted the international community to look at ocean fertilization. The issue was taken up by several treaty regimes, but most of the work to date has been under the London Convention and Protocol. That’s because ocean fertilization and many other mCDR techniques involve adding materials to ocean waters and thus implicate the ocean dumping provisions in the London Convention and Protocol.

Briefly, the London Convention and Protocol regulate dumping, which is defined to include “any deliberate disposal of waste or other matter at sea from vessels, aircraft, platforms, or man-made structures.” In a 2008 resolution, the parties to the London Convention and Protocol agreed that their “scope . . . includes ocean fertilization activities” and that those activities can qualify as dumping, at least in some circumstances. The parties drew a distinction between ocean fertilization research activities, which may fall outside the definition of dumping and be allowed if certain requirements are met, and ocean fertilization deployments, which should be treated as dumping and “should not be allowed.”

In 2013, the parties to the London Protocol adopted an amendment, which sought codify this approach. The amendment deals with the placement of matter in the ocean in connection with marine geoengineering activities (as defined above). It provides that:

“Contracting Parties shall not allow the placement of matter into the sea from vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures at sea for marine geoengineering activities listed in annex 4, unless the listing provides that the activity . . . may be authorized under a permit.”

Thus, while the amendment applies broadly to marine geoengineering activities, only those activities specifically listed in the annex are covered. Currently only ocean fertilization is listed. The listing provides that permits may be issued for ocean fertilization research but not for deployment (i.e., mirroring the approach taken in the 2008 resolution).

As previously reported on this blog, for the last few years, the parties to the London Convention and Protocol have been discussing how to address other marine geoengineering activities. They have focused on two specific mCDR techniques: (1) ocean alkalinity enhancement, which aims to accelerate chemical processes through which the ocean uptakes and stores carbon dioxide from the atmosphere by adding ground alkaline rock or other alkaline materials to the water; and (2) biomass cultivation and sinking, which involves growing seaweed or other plants to uptake carbon dioxide from the atmosphere and convert it into organic carbon which can, at least in theory, then be stored in the deep ocean by sinking the plant material. Like ocean fertilization, both approaches require further research to fully evaluate their efficacy, benefits, and risks. Even so, a growing number of private-sector entities are looking to commercialize the techniques, and some are funding their operations through the sale of carbon credits or similar mechanisms (see here and here, for example).

In the ocean fertilization context, the parties to the London Convention and Protocol have sought to restrict this type of commercial activity, and declared that only “legitimate scientific research” that is not influenced by “economic interests” and does not result in any “financial and/or economic gain” should be allowed. Some parties have argued that the same approach should be taken to other mCDR activities. For example, at the last meeting of the parties in November, the German delegation expressed particular concern about commercial activity in the field and stated that, given the early stage of development of most mCDR techniques, deployment “in a commercial manner” is “not justifiable” at the current time. Other parties have, however, been more supportive of commercial activity. The U.S., for instance, has recognized an important role for the private sector in advancing mCDR. The National Marine Carbon Dioxide Removal Research Strategy, issued in November 2024, noted that “[c]ommercial entities may . . . contribute valuable mCDR research,” and that those entities are “leveraging commitments from investors to purchase credits for carbon removal in the future . . . to unlock the private capital . . . need[ed] to operate and develop mCDR technologies.” The strategy further recognized that this “[p]rivate funding . . . plays a key role” in advancing the field.

In addition to these differing views on the appropriateness of commercial mCDR activity, the parties to the London Convention and Protocol have also expressed different opinions on how to advance international governance of mCDR. As noted above, in 2013, the parties agreed to an amendment addressing ocean fertilization. However, over ten years later, that amendment has still not entered into force. For that to happen, the amendment must be ratified by two-thirds of the 55 parties to the London Protocol. To date, there have been only six ratifications – by Estonia, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, and the U.K. Two additional countries – South Africa and Switzerland – indicated at the last meeting of the parties that they were considering ratifying the 2013 amendment. The parties “noted the importance of more ratifications of the 2013 amendment” and “encouraged delegations to ratify” as soon as possible.

Even if that happens and the 2013 amendment enters into force, it will only apply to ocean fertilization. But, as noted, a range of other mCDR techniques are also being explored. At their meeting last year, the parties considered various options for addressing those other techniques, including:

1. Adopting a resolution specifying which marine geoengineering activities fall within the scope of the London Convention and Protocol and how those instruments apply to the activities.
2. Listing additional techniques under the 2013 amendment such that, when the amendment enters into force, it will apply not just ocean fertilization, but also other listed techniques.
3. Adopting a new amendment on marine geoengineering to replace the 2013 amendment. The idea is to replicate the 2013 amendment in its entirety, but list additional techniques (beyond just ocean fertilization) in annex 4.

The parties expressed differing views on these options. According to a summary of the parties’ discussions, the delegation from Germany expressed support for adoption of a resolution along the lines set out above (in point (1)), arguing that “would be timely and of great benefit.” The Netherlands also supported developing a resolution. Others did not, however. The United Kingdom and United States both opposed adoption of a resolution at this time and argued that further work was required to define the techniques to be covered. Notably, the United States delegation further asserted that, if a resolution is to be adopted, it should “contain affirmative language so as not to prejudice future decision-making on the deployment of [marine geoengineering] techniques for purposes other than legitimate scientific research.”

The United Kingdom, United States, Finland, and Switzerland also opposed listing additional marine geoengineering techniques under the 2013 amendment. The United Kingdom noted that “amending an amendment that was not in force . . . would create confusion and might act as a barrier to securing further ratifications” of the 2013 amendment. Finland and Sweden similarly argued that the focus should be on encouraging further ratifications of the 2013 amendment. Finland also opposed the adoption of a wholly new amendment (i.e., to replace the 2013 amendment), since that would “require parties that had accepted the 2013 amendments to amend their previous approvals.” Other countries were more open to the idea, however. The Kingdom of the Netherlands, for example, “was supportive of regulating . . . additional [marine geoengineering] techniques” under the London Convention and Protocol. It “was in favor of developing [a] resolution . . . and did not see an issue with amending the 2013 amendments that were not yet in force.”

Given these differences of opinion, the parties ultimately decided not to advance a resolution or any new amendments. Instead, they stated merely that they would continue work on marine geoengineering, and “evaluate options for appropriate action” in the future. That is, in many ways, a disappointing result given that the parties have already been working on the topic of marine geoengineering for nearly two decades and have relatively little to show for it. Meanwhile, the mCDR sector continues to grow, and researchers and commercial entities are looking to advance projects in the ocean.

There is some good news, though. The statement adopted by the parties notes that they are continuing their “discussions on marine geoengineering including risks to the marine environment and potential benefits for mitigating climate change” (emphasis added). The reference here to the potential benefits of marine geoengineering is highly significant as, in previous meetings, the parties (or at least some of them) have suggested that only the risks of marine geoengineering activities should be considered. (For more on those previous discussions, see my paper here.) At this year’s meeting, several parties pushed back on that idea, and urged consideration of the techniques’ benefits as well. The United Kingdom, for example, emphasized “the importance of finding safe routes for [carbon] removal at scale to help meet the goals of the Paris Climate Agreement and stated support for legitimate innovation in marine technologies that could have a role in solving the climate crisis.” Germany expressly “requested that both potential risks and benefits of [marine geoengineering] techniques for mitigation be taken into account in future deliberations,” and that request was supported by France and an observer from Greenpeace International.

That might not sound like much but it represents an important step forward. Unless we recognize and account for the full range of potential impacts of marine geoengineering activities – both negative and positive – we cannot hope to develop an effective international governance regime. Such a regime should be designed to facilitate activities needed to mitigate climate change while also ensuring that any adverse social or environmental impacts are avoided, minimized, and/or managed effectively. That requires a shift in thinking for parties to agreements like the London Convention and Protocol, which have traditionally focused on preventing environmentally risky activities, rather than advancing potentially beneficial ones.

The parties to the London Convention and Protocol have, to their credit, recognized that they may lack the expertise and information needed to holistically evaluate mCDR and other marine geoengineering activities. The parties have thus committed to “advance[ing] their scientific understanding of marine geoengineering techniques.” They have begun a process to establish a “roster of experts” to advise them and pledged to engage more closely with other intergovernmental organizations and NGOs that may have relevant expertise. These are small steps and, as always, their success will depend on whether and how the plans are executed. But, they offer some hope that progress may be being made, albeit slowly.